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ason Hill, wondering about the contemporary relevance of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism, claims that ‘(I)t is still not clear whether 
Diogenes, in widening the human community to include others, 
was advocating anything like what contemporary moral cosmopolitans 
such as myself have in mind.’1 On his account, the answer seems to be 
that the Cynics are relevant as originators of a ‘radical notion of 
cosmopolitanism,’ but their equation of human citizenship with 
rationality (correspondence to ‘cosmos’ or the world’s order) is 
‘exalted,’ ‘abstract and idealistic.’2 The advance made by the Stoics over 
the Cynics, he argues, is that with the former we have a move toward 
the concrete, towards a moral practice of ‘cross-communal affiliation’ 
that more closely presages ‘the concomitant decline in the significance 
of tribal fixation and its attendant overdetermination,’3. I maintain that 
these ideas are already operative with ancient Cynics such as Diogenes 
and are in fact more radical than the Stoic version that succeeds them. 
Seneca indeed advocates leaving behind one’s own oppressive social 
structure and venturing beyond to other nations and states in order to 
fulfill one’s rational human potential. However, in this as in many other 
matters he never bothered to take his own advice. In contrast, the 
Cynics actually do practice this ‘cross-communal affiliation’ and 
actively seek to unsettle fixed ethnic identities not from some 
imaginary cosmopolis that remains hopelessly idealistic but rather 
immanently from within the different communities they move between. 
 
J 
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Perhaps a more important difference between Cynic and Stoic 
cosmopolitanism is the fact that the former aims at real political 
transformation via the practice of transvaluation while the latter 
espouses the ‘abstract’ and ‘idealistic’ cosmopolitanism Hill attributes to 
the Cynics.4 For a Stoic, one can inwardly remain a citizen of the 
cosmos while outwardly following existing oppressive social 
conventions, indeed one is often counseled to do just this, or else die or 
go into self-imposed exile. The two options are often meant as a 
consolation in the present, only becoming ‘real’ alternatives in the most 
extreme situations of oppression—e.g., being enslaved, or suffering 
violence that would disgrace oneself. For the Cynic, in contrast, one 
cannot remain inwardly a member of a rational cosmic order, while 
maintaining outward compliance with social conditions however 
irrational and oppressive these are. Rather, the Cynic attempts to make 
the ‘cosmic order’ outwardly manifest in any given social order by 
transforming the latter so that it fulfills its promise of a shared good 
life for human beings. One does this by precisely and specifically 
negating those given features of social life that do not stand up to 
rational scrutiny—ethnic superiority, nationalistic chauvinism, male 
‘superiority’ over women, the loftiness of the wealthy at the expense of 
debasing the poor. I examine each of these aspects of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism in what follows. 
Were Diogenes merely the espouser of an abstract and idealized 
cosmopolitanism, a utopia in which only truly rational human beings, 
the ‘wise’, are recognized as citizens regardless of race, class, and 
gender, we would be hard-pressed to explain his close engagement with 
all manner of Athenians and Corinthians, drawn from all social strata, 
and with a variety of intellectual figures and political leaders spanning 
the breadth of the ancient Greek world. And when we turn to his 
Politeia, for all its satirical features it is nevertheless clear that he is 
arguing for quite specific revolutionary transformations of social life 
that are not compatible with the kind of anti- or apolitical ‘rugged 
individualism’ the Cynics are often taken to embody. Though Cynics 
such as Diogenes themselves lived like ‘rugged individuals,’ 
independent of whatever socio-political environment they found 
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themselves in, this was the case only because the given conditions of 
ethnic, class, and gender oppression and exclusion functioned to hinder 
in advance any attempt at a revolutionary transformation of social 
relations. For instance, in Athens those who were xenoi (foreigners) or 
metics (resident aliens), those who were too poor to meet the property 
requirements for citizenship or had lost everything and had to become 
day-laborers and sailors, likewise women sequestered within the houses 
of their fathers and husbands, were not officially recognized as citizens; 
they were denied fundamental civic rights such as isonomia (equality 
before the law) and parrhēsia (free speech).  
 Thus, the first act of resistance to this order was to remove 
oneself individually from the wrong state of affairs, to become a ‘rugged 
individual,’ as it were—to escape oppressive warping and establish a 
space for critique. This space was not the imaginary realm of an 
idealized ‘cosmopolis’ but rather the very real contested political space 
of the various communities the Cynics wandered through. They were, 
like Socrates, ‘out of place’ in their supposed homes.5 ‘Being out of 
place’ (atopos) at home, being at home in being out of place, the Cynic 
sought to render given ethnic, gender and class-based exclusionary 
practices that were presently settled and ‘at home’ within various 
national spaces as truly ‘out of place’. The Cynic further seeks to 
transform what is currently understood as ‘out of place’ or ‘absurd’ 
(women’s equality with men, the equality of barbarian and Greek, the 
worthiness and honesty of manual labor and thus the equality of poor 
workers with their aristocratic, leisured ‘superiors’) into that which 
belongs ‘at home’. These measures actually fulfil the promise of the 
homeland and its ideals rather than betraying them ideologically and 
with brute force.  
 Thus also, to respond to Hill’s question: ancient Cynics such as 
Diogenes are indeed advocating something not unlike what he himself 
is proposing as a self-declared ‘contemporary moral cosmopolitan.’6 In 
fact, they are doing so in a variety of ways that have yet to be 
recognized. To show this I will briefly delineate a few essential features 
of Hill’s contemporary cosmopolitanism while suggesting their Cynic 
provenance, before turning to a detailed treatment of the ancient 
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context for the emergence of Cynic cosmopolitanism and the latter’s 
still poorly understood basic features. According to Hill, moral 
cosmopolitanism’s essential features include ‘moral forgetting.’ 
‘Unlearning the past, throwing off the tyranny of false legacies, is a 
new way of infusing the world with an assemblage of that which is 
truly one’s own. To create a new moral self is to create a self that is 
willing to undo the old self in many respects.’7 This is the first step, 
which makes possible the others—we must first bracket what we have 
been (made) in order to make ourselves freely. To do so requires 
forgetting what has been done to us. The Cynics model an exemplary 
form of this forgetting—the first moment of transvaluation, which 
subverts dominant social conventions and shows them to be untenable, 
irrational, inconsistent, failures (the negative moment of Cynic 
critique). For instance, consider Diogenes’ response to the person who 
reminded him of his past, that he was just an exiled counterfeiter from 
the semi-barbaric Pontus: ’That was how I became a philosopher’ (D.L. 
VI.49). Suffering exile is forgotten and replaced by a proto-evocation of 
felix culpa. The loss of national identity is affirmed as a precondition for 
becoming a philosopher and for inhabiting the ‘cosmos’. 
The sentence of exile imposed upon Diogenes by the Sinopeans is 
transvalued into his sentence on them—exiled by them, he becomes a 
philosopher; being a philosopher he condemns them to staying at home 
in Sinope. In other words, Diogenes ‘forgets’ his national identity in 
order to achieve a superior identity—that of the cosmopolitan 
philosopher—while those who see his statelessness as a reproach 
mistake their own myopia for his indignity. Consider the similar 
moment in the life of Antisthenes. Being asked what learning is the 
most necessary, he replied, ‘How to get rid of having anything to 
unlearn’ (to periairein…to apomanthanein) (D.L. VI.7).  
Unlearning connotes an active process of casting off one’s 
uncritically accepted conventional cultural baggage, a necessary 
propaedeutic for beginning to genuinely learn anything at all. One clear 
example of this is the Cynic tradition of the master requiring a 
prospective pupil to engage in activities conventionally deemed 
shameful, though not on any natural or rational grounds. For instance, 
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carrying a fish or a piece of cheese around in public, or answering a 
pupil’s initial request for instruction by brandishing a staff in his or her 
direction. Conventionally, it is shameful to carry around foodstuffs in 
public (as though one were a servant, and with the obtrusive smells of 
the items in question assailing the dignified noses of one’s peers) and 
shameful to be insulted by an ‘inferior’, especially by someone who has 
every outward appearance of an impoverished beggar. Yet it is 
paramount that one ‘unlearn’—that is ‘forget’—these conventional 
notions of shame, not to become as shameless as a dog, as those with 
too casual and polemical an understanding of Cynicism would have it, 
but rather truly to understand what one should be ashamed of, namely 
one’s uncritically accepted belief in the propriety of certain standard 
forms of conduct. Likewise, one must comprehend one’s conventional 
attempts to ‘fit in’ with what is traditionally expected of one based on 
one’s fixed place within an irrational social hierarchy.  
 The second feature of contemporary cosmopolitanism is ‘moral 
maturity’—taking up responsibility for authoring one’s own self, which 
Hill characterizes as ‘a weaned identity.’8 In Kantian terms, this would 
be Mündigkeit, or ‘maturity’ in the sense of being able to reason 
consistently for oneself and engage in spirited debate with others, 
without dependence on the authority of ‘guardians’ (teachers, parents, 
officials, etc.). For the Cynics the correlate term is autarkeia, self-
sufficiency as freedom from dependence on others. Being free from 
dependence on others does not mean being free from their influence or 
from engaging with them in various kinds of dialogue or struggle. 
Rather, it means freely relating to others, responding to them from a 
position that cannot be compelled to act otherwise than reason, human 
nature, suggests.  
In characterizing moral maturity as a ‘weaned identity,’9 Hill 
draws attention to that from which moral maturity must depart: the 
teat of uncritically accepted social conventions that one need merely 
reflect rather than think through and truly, autonomously, make one’s 
own. Diogenes first weans himself, and then also seeks to wean others. 
Over and over again he engages with others to show them that their 
uncritical acceptance of social conventions is untenable, is riven by 
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contradiction, requires the suppression of reason, requires us to ‘not 
think too much’ about what it is we are doing and why. He thus aims to 
make those he meets morally mature, to free them from their tutelage 
to various authorities, whether famous philosophers, tyrants, religious 
institutions and officials, or politicians. More than this, though, an 
ancient Cynic such as Diogenes, on my reading, is also a paradigm for 
what Hill describes as the ‘creative agency’10 that underlies moral 
maturity, where it is not just a matter of being able to reason for 
oneself and take responsibility for one’s decisions but also of re-
imagining and re-inventing the static self that has been imposed upon 
one by social conventions and historical baggage, turning it into one’s 
own artful work.  
As we will see, the ancient Cynics’ creative agency involves not 
merely re-imagining culturally inherited and oppressively cumbersome 
identities predicated upon the exclusion of others but of transvaluating, 
and redeeming, such traditions with an adversarial political praxis that 
carries on a kind of immanent critique pioneered by Socrates, in which 
traditional values are simultaneously inhabited, made one’s own, and 
not merely transformed, made other than they were initially, but in fact 
revolutionized and thus brought ‘full circle’ back to what they were 
supposed to be all along. 
The Problem of the Sources and the Articulation of a Novel Approach 
A spectre haunts the interpretation of ancient Cynicism: the spectre of 
historical veracity. What we have of Cynic philosophy is gleaned from a 
tradition that simultaneously preserves and distorts it. There are few 
primary texts from Cynics themselves that are extant and even what 
we have on this score is by no means the best of the ancient Cynics. 
The poetry of Cercidas and the diatribes of Teles11 represent some of 
the earliest primary materials. While interesting, even they already 
take shape in the post-Antisthenes, post-Diogenes era when ancient 
Cynicism is already a contested legacy, being appropriated by emergent 
Stoicism, and in dialogue with Aristotle and his followers. The 
philosophy of the dogs (kynes) is already a bone of contention amongst 
the various heirs of Socrates and the proliferation of Greek schools in 
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the Hellenistic era. To illustrate what I mean by the ‘problem’ of the 
sources let us consider two important discussions regarding the 
fragmentary state of the sources and the complex literary nature of 
much of what remains, whether ‘original’ texts or later recapitulations 
of Cynic ideas and themes by sympathetic, neutral, and hostile sources. 
Bracht Branham and Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé note that since the 
Cynic sources are mostly biographical, compilations of anecdotes and 
apophthegmata, and since these collections are much later than their 
original subjects, a ‘cautious approach’ is warranted, ‘since nothing 
guarantees the historicity of the tradition.’12  
As we will see below with Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting,13 though, 
and as becomes clear in further remarks by Branham and Goulet-Cazé, 
14 this historical unreliability does not mean interpretation of the 
philosophical significance of ancient Cynicism is impossible. In fact, the 
problem turns out to be not so much one of acknowledging the 
difficulty of accessing a historically veracious account of ancient 
Cynicism as it is of wading through and sorting out the contested 
legacy of ancient Cynicism, in which the ‘original’ version is only ever 
refracted through a variety of lenses, some sympathetic, some neutral, 
many hostile. The figure of Diogenes ‘is…always already in the process 
of reception.’15 There is no direct access to his works, and anytime we 
read anything about them we are reading it from a source that has 
received the legacy in a certain way.  
The different receptive-interpretative options range from 
‘idealization of the tradition… to selective reinterpretation and 
appropriation… to satiric denunciation… and overt suppression.’16 It 
should also be noted, and is further complicating, that the example 
Branham and Goulet-Cazé give for satiric denunciation (Lucian) can 
also be cited as a source of ‘idealization of the tradition’, as he is the 
author not merely of Peregrinus Proteus but also of Demonax (negative 
and praiseful portrayals of Cynicism). Thus some sources cannot even 
be categorized into one of these three types but are instead profoundly 
ambivalent. These factors lead them to conclude that ‘The study of 
Cynicism…is inseparable from the study of its reception.’17 Because so 
many different ancient authors and partisan groups appropriated and 
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interpreted Cynic material and re-presented it in a variety of contexts, 
according to ‘their own social and intellectual trajectories…we should 
resist the temptation to reduce these many individual acts of reception 
to a single structure or pattern.’18 In other words, what we have is a 
kind of poikilos mosaic that would be flattened out and made drab if we 
forcefully abstract a single essence or pattern to Cynic philosophy. On 
my view, we should embrace this messiness and accept it, 
acknowledging the variety of interests behind Cynic appropriations and 
re-presentations, its historical opacity, while nonetheless seeking out its 
philosophical significance—a significance that is not reducible to any 
one ‘structure’ or ‘pattern.’  
 The reading of the Cynics attempted here, part of a much larger 
project,19 lays some of the groundwork for interpreting them as 
prototypical figures engaged in what Horkheimer and Adorno call the 
‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’. Niehues-Pröbsting provides support for 
this reading when, discussing the reception of the Cynics in modernity, 
he argues that  
in Cynicism, folly is not a contingent moment, but a 
consequence of reason itself, the consequence of the excesses 
of reason. Cynic folly is the dark and seamy side of reason. 
In Cynicism, the Enlightenment discovers the danger of 
reason being perverted, reason turning into irrationality and 
madness, reason being frustrated because of its own far too 
exalted expectations. The Enlightenment becomes aware of 
this menace to itself through its affinity with Cynicism. The 
reflection on Cynicism provides a necessary piece of self-
recognition and self-criticism. Consequently the failure of 
the Enlightenment—or of one part of it—leads to cynicism 
in the modern sense of the word. ‘Cynicism is enlightened 
false consciousness.’’20  
On such a reading, the Cynics can be seen to be working through the 
Bann (‘spell’)21 of Enlightenment reason which consists of the 
construction of a perfect society founded on the immiseration and 
psychological mutilation of the vast majority of its members: equally, 
	Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2015(1) 
	
9 
the reasoned attempt to articulate ethical ways of life promising 
individual flourishing despite a systemically unjust socioeconomic 
order. These options are offered as though one could live on one’s very 
own island of the blessed in the midst of a war zone: they unwittingly 
engender the very opposite of that which is intended—Plato’s kallipolis 
a totalitarian noocracy, Aristotle’s elitist ‘golf club’,22 neither is a place 
where most human beings would realize their potential since most 
would be reduced to mere means, ‘human resources’, for the lives of 
their ‘superiors’. In contrast, the Cynics attempt to restore what has 
been excluded from traditional political life to its rightful place as 
genuine and precious part of such a life, they bring each excluded 
element back from its suffered marginalization. Thus women, slaves, 
workers, barbarians, resident aliens (even children and animals, 
perhaps) will all be essential active parts of a shared flourishing life 
rather than relegated to mere supports or props for their elite male 
overlords. They are human beings, too. And the promise of political life 
was the common and mutual flourishing of the political animal—the 
human being, not a small subset of males drawn from and exalted over 
the human race.  
 According to Niehues-Pröbsting the problem of Cynic sources is 
not so much their fragmentary nature as it is their literary form. This is 
because what the tradition has preserved is for the most part stories of 
what particular Cynics did or said at some time. It is not just the case 
that anecdotes and apophthegmata ‘are the most significant media of 
Cynic tradition,’ they are also ‘the literary forms most suitable to 
Cynicism and its representation.’23 In other words, it is no accident, or 
at the very least need not be interpreted as an accident, that what we 
primarily have in the case of the Cynics are anecdotes and 
apophthegmata rather than a random sampling of the works one finds 
listed at the ends of their respective lives in Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of 
the Eminent Philosophers, but rather it is the case that there is something 
essential about Cynic philosophy that only a non-systematic, non-
treatise literary form can provide and facilitate. This anecdotal 
tradition regarding the Cynics was quite influential for the Western 
tradition until it was undermined in the modern era, first by Pierre 
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Bayle and like-minded proto-Enlightenment encyclopediasts by means 
of historical criticism, according to which much of the preserved 
anecdotal tradition is historically spurious, later additions that cannot 
be traced to their putative original sources,24 and then by Hegel and his 
followers, who faulted Cynicism for its non-systematic character.  
 This concern still animates contemporary scholarship to the 
extent to which one is concerned with identifying what can be 
attributed with historical veracity to the historical Diogenes and what 
cannot be, or more generally with identifying that which is 
authentically of the 4th and 3rd centuries B.C. and that which in all 
likelihood are latter additions and modifications. More broadly, if one 
considers the whole of ancient Cynicism, a question is raised with what 
belongs properly and in a historically plausible way to antiquity and 
what reflects a late-antique Christian appropriation that is then carried 
on all the way through the Renaissance and into modernity, 
culminating in the significant influence of the reception of Cynicism 
upon the Enlightenment. One here sifts through the various texts and 
rules in or out this or that anecdote or apophthegma on the basis of its 
perceived connection to the ‘real’ Cynicism of ancient Greece (and 
perhaps its extension into the Roman era, through Lucian, Julian, and 
the Church Fathers). What we see here is the culling of the tradition in 
favour of an accurate historical representation of ancient Cynicism, 
which, as Niehues-Pröbsting acutely notes, fails to recognize ‘that the 
value of an anecdote—its philosophical and moral meaning—does not 
necessarily depend on its historical truth.’25  
What I am after in my reading on the Cynics is precisely this—
‘its philosophical and moral meaning’—rather than historical veracity. 
This does not mean that the historical context of ancient Cynicism, and 
its relation to other contemporaneous philosophical schools, should be 
willfully ignored or that one should never point to historical conditions 
as illuminating an understanding of a given passage or text in question. 
It is rather a case of not looking to such conditions for the final answer, 
or for the conclusive import, of Cynic thought. For instance, the 
emergence of ancient Cynicism is clearly connected with the well-
known ‘decline of the polis’. One could view ancient Cynicism as a 
	Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2015(1) 
	
11 
valid, or perhaps hysterical, reaction to such a state of affairs. However, 
at best this would merely curate ancient Cynicism as one more museum 
piece in the antiquities section of the history of ideas—alongside 
exhibits on other Hellenistic schools.  
In contrast, I am trying to identify the philosophical significance 
of their work for those of us today that still take ourselves to be heirs of 
the Enlightenment project of constructing a world in which reason and 
peace prevail over unreason and war, in which national differences are 
overcome by a cosmopolitics that preserves those differences while 
negating them as pretext and motive for violent conflict. Whether this 
or that particular anecdote or saying is historically accurate is of 
concern for classicists and historians, for purposes of classification and 
for a better understanding of various historical periods.  
On my reading, though, even the fabricated stories are worth 
reading as ciphers for the philosophical and moral meaning of ancient 
Cynicism. For one thing, they often present a ‘likely story’ (eikos mythos) 
that may as well be true even if it in fact is not. Not unlike Pericles’ 
funeral oration in Thucydides, they present us with a reasonable 
approximation—and an inventive one—perhaps even ‘better’ than the 
original in some cases. Also, they point to the fact that in cases of 
transmitting a tradition what matters most is not literal accuracy and 
careful bookkeeping but rather the preservation of its ethos by means of 
dynamically creative re-invention: if the Cynics, like Socrates, were 
primarily oral philosophers, if even their supposed writings were 
amusing pastimes that did not forthrightly reveal their actual views 
(like Plato, perhaps), then asking what they really did or said at some 
time and what was a later fabrication or embellishment is akin to 
asking what the historically accurate version of the Iliad or the Nostoi 
were, since we cannot trust Homer to give us a faithful portrait.  
 The second and even worse undermining of the Cynic tradition 
was carried out by Hegel and his followers who dismissed the Cynics, 
and all literary non-systematic philosophy, as not in fact truly 
philosophical. The history of philosophy, on this view, is a history of 
systematic theories or at least of theories that aspire to systematicity, 
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to explaining the totality of that which is. According to this line of 
thought, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, make the grade but the 
Cynics do not. Since the material on them is inextricably entwined with 
their biographies, indeed, with their way of life, with their philosophy as 
a way of life, it is on this view philosophically irrelevant, of interest 
only to historians, or if at all to historians of philosophy then only 
insofar as it reflects and sheds light on other ‘real’ philosophical 
schools, such as the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Stoa.  
Niehues-Pröbsting perceptively points out that the reception of 
Cynicism in modernity has taken place largely outside of these 
historicizing and systematizing-classificatory schemas, occurring ‘…in 
the conscious imitation of particular Cynic gestures, in the avowal of 
Cynic maxims and attitudes, in the literary relation to Cynic motifs and 
the figure of the Cynic, in the use of this figure as one of projection and 
identification.’26 Ultimately, in the larger project of which this essay is 
but one part, I hope to trace as well the Cynic reception in modernity, 
as prototypical figures for the dialectic of enlightenment, as carrying 
out an auto-critique of the Greek enlightenment that prefigures the 
later critique of the Enlightenment inaugurated by Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Freud and extended by the Frankfurt School. Hence I am not so 
much interested in presenting a historically verifiable version of ancient 
Cynicism that has been reduced to an extreme Socraticism. Rather, I 
want to trace the archetype of a certain kind of critical response to the 
Enlightenment project of a rationally ordered society in which human 
beings would realize their full rational potential and live flourishing 
lives. I thus read Diogenes and his Politeia as a significant critique of 
the failures of Platonic and Aristotelian attempts to construct ideal 
political communities, prefiguring later critiques of bourgeois 
democracy and even late capitalism. 
Ancient Context for Cynic Cosmopolitanism 
The Cynic cosmopolis is openly inclusivist, even universalist, with 
room for women, slaves, workers, while the designations ‘barbarian’ 
and ‘resident alien’ cease to exist as meaningful characterizations of 
human beings in the context of a polis as wide as the cosmos. It thus 
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prefigures Immanuel Kant’s Fifth Thesis, from his Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective, that ‘The greatest problem for the 
human species to which nature compels it to seek a solution is the achievement 
of a civil society which administers right universally.’27 Two things are 
worth noting in this thesis specifically with regard to a Cynic 
connection: the claim that ‘nature’ is what impels human beings toward 
the accomplishment of a cosmopolitan community and that such a 
community is ‘universal’. The claim concerning nature ought to be read 
in the light of the Cynic conception of a life kata phusin (‘according to 
nature’).  
According to one ancient summary of Diogenes’ views, ‘instead of 
useless works human beings should choose works according to nature 
so as to live happily’ (D.L. VI.71). As we will see below, to live 
according to nature does not mean to renounce human rationality and 
live like an animal but rather to hold nature and social convention in a 
critical opposition so that the latter makes good on its claim of being a 
refined version of the former. Another way to put this is to see that for 
the Cynics, as for Aristotle, human beings are rational animals—
though the Cynics never lose sight of human animality and its demands 
such that they would idealize human essence as a kind of disembodied, 
or de-materialized, operation of intellect.  
Rather, and this also separates them from Kant, the human body 
and its animal needs are not a hindrance to or so much encumbrance on 
the human intellect. Proper care for the human body, and its exercise, is 
given its place as co-constitutive of human happiness rather than an 
uncomfortable and perhaps embarrassing factum brutum.28 The 
significance of ‘universal’ in Kant’s thesis echoes the radical meaning of 
cosmopolitanism: a universal political community, a community 
without borders in which no one is left out. While it is possible, though 
quite difficult, to find the kernel of a concept of a universal political 
community in certain passages of Aristotle’s Politics,29 what I hope to 
show here is that the Cynics are the real source of the cosmopolitan 
project, and that their ancient cosmopolis is not merely something 
crude and unformed, not merely a parody of its precedents (such as 
Plato’s ideal polis in the Republic), but rather offers a number of positive 
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features that link it to what are often thought of as distinctly modern 
and even contemporary cosmopolitan concerns.  
The Cynics are often taken to reject the polis outright, a view that 
will be critiqued below. However, their ‘rejection’ of the polis is actually 
made for the sake of the polis. The Cynics simultaneously inhabit and 
withdraw from the midst of the polis and have a concern for its fringes 
that carries on a Socratic politics of publicly confronting and 
interrogating authorities and their claims to legitimacy. At the same 
time, they approach each fellow human being as a brother or sister in 
order to test their commitment to virtue, and thus their progress 
toward fulfillment of human nature in rational activity, i.e., their 
progress toward the happiness that is their natural end. While the 
general inclination has been to read the Cynics as rejecting social 
conventions, traditional beliefs, and politics, we shall, like Diogenes 
enter the theatre as everyone left it,30 run against the current and read 
them as in fact seeking to redeem values, by restoring to them the value 
they have lost in their failure to live up to their promise. Though 
indebted to the work of nineteenth century German scholarship, and 
more recent work in Germany and the United States, what follows is 
an original attempt to develop a clearer and more detailed 
understanding of the Cynic contribution to ancient political thought.31  
In what follows a Cynic politics will be articulated that will show 
them not to be merely negators, mere critics of existing social 
conventions, but rather at the same time espousers of a positive 
conception of both political practice and of a better social order that can 
be realized by human action and is practicable. In the first place, a 
couple of remarks on Cynic political methodology will be made, 
situating their political thought and practice within the Socratic 
tradition, while also noting how crucial it is to understand the purpose 
of their hyperbolic mode of expression so that we do not misunderstand 
them to be advocating an extremism virtually impossible on any 
general or universal scale.  
Next, an outline of their politics will be ventured in which both 
negative and positive moments will be treated. Having argued against a 
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merely negative conception of Cynic cosmopolitanism, a discussion of 
the essential features that would characterize a positive Cynic 
cosmopolis will be presented. Cynic views of labor, economic 
organization, equality of the sexes, sexual relations, freedom, and 
redemption of the excluded, their proposed inclusion and integration of 
all human beings within a cosmopolis where everyone has a valued 
place will be delineated and analyzed. Throughout, points of 
intersection and agreement with the Socrates of both Plato and 
Xenophon, as well as Aristotle’s ideal polis and political thought more 
generally, will be emphasized while critical differences will also be 
noted and serve to sharpen understanding of the Cynics on politics, 
while tracing some of the ways in which they follow from a Socratic 
precedent. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of the Cynic 
cosmopolitan legacy for modern and contemporary cosmopolitan 
projects.  
The Cynics as Inheritors of Socrates’ Art of True Politics 
In Plato’s Gorgias Socrates famously characterizes his 
philosophical practice of engaging others in conversation and 
subjecting their views to critical evaluation as ‘an attempt at the art of 
true politics.’32 Already in this seemingly absurd characterization of 
private conversations as the realm for true political practice there lies a 
proto-Cynical transvaluation of values. Socrates is affirming that what 
would have been considered idiōtikē or ‘private’ is in fact politikē or 
‘public, political’ (while what conventionally passes for politikē is 
rhētorikē or rhetoric, hence actually oudemia or nothing at all, a mere 
tribē or pastime, a kind of kolakeia or flattery).33 To understand more 
clearly what Socrates has in mind we must look to his own clear and 
concise description of this ‘true art of politics’ in the Apology. This 
political practice consists of going around and engaging others, 
shaming them for naked pursuit of wealth and status and reminding 
them that virtue or excellence is not merely more important but 
fundamental for human happiness—all the wealth, power, and status in 
the world is worthless without it. Those who protest that they in fact 
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do care for their virtue are questioned and tested to see if they are 
sincere: if so, they are released; if not, they are reproached.34  
This practice is thoroughly and yet unconventionally political in 
its use of parrhēsia, an Athenian political right, outside the confines of 
the ekklēsia and in private conversations with others. Yet, these ‘private’ 
conversations were most often conducted in very public settings, in the 
agora and in gymnasia, thus blurring the lines between the private and 
public (and yet not being another traditional form of parrhēsia, 
privileged speech between equals behind closed doors).35 Socrates 
adduces his voluntary poverty as proof of his divine mission, noting 
that instead of tending to his own household affairs he instead ‘always 
does your business, going to each of you privately, as a father or an 
older brother might do, persuading you to care for virtue’.36  
The ‘true political art’ practiced by Socrates consists of 
interrogating others who neglect virtue to pursue wealth and status, of 
reproaching them and attempting to turn them toward the pursuit of 
virtue instead. And this is the ‘true’ art of politics because it aims to 
accomplish what traditional politics, with its dispensation of offices and 
redistribution of wealth, has promised but failed to accomplish: the 
actual happiness, the flourishing of human beings living together 
within the political community. Socrates is condemned to death for this 
practice and before being led away curses those who have condemned 
him:  
I affirm, you men who condemned me to death, that 
vengeance will come upon you right after my death, and 
much harsher, by Zeus, than the sort you give me by killing 
me. For you have done this deed supposing that you will be 
released from giving an account of your life, but it will turn 
out much the opposite for you, as I affirm. There will be 
more who will refute you, whom I have been holding back; 
you did not perceive them. And they will be harsher, 
inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more 
indignant. For if you suppose that by killing human beings 
you will prevent someone from reproaching you for not 
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living correctly, you do not think nobly. For that kind of 
release is not at all possible or noble; rather the kind that is 
both noblest and easiest is not to restrain others, but to 
equip oneself to be the best possible. So, having divined 
these things for you who voted against me, I am released. 
Apol. 39c-d (Trans. by West) 
These others whom Socrates has held back, younger and harsher, who 
carry out his vengeance on the Athenians, are none other than the 
Cynics. Indeed, it is Socrates’ younger and close associate, Antisthenes, 
traditionally considered the founder of Cynicism,37 who later drove 
Anytus out of Athens and saw that Meletus paid for his frivolous 
accusations with his life.38 He certainly could not be referring to his 
other followers, none of whom carried out Socrates’ practice of 
confronting and reproaching others for neglecting virtue in this direct, 
agitating manner. Having been condemned to death Socrates sets his 
pack of Cynics, initially Antisthenes and other unnamed associates,39 
loose upon the Athenians to continue his ‘true political art’ of reforming 
the lives and priorities of those around them, though the Cynics, being 
harsher, are not so much estranged insiders in the manner of Socrates 
and his wealthy fellow-travelers (such as Plato or Aristippus) but 
rather militant agitators and even revolutionaries, seeking to 
fundamentally challenge and transform the social and political life 
Socrates was content to simply unsettle and question from within, with 
his characteristic civility and nearly inscrutable irony. 
 One final Socratic key for interpretation of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism is to be found in Plato’s ‘Digression’ in the Theaetetus, 
especially the critique of the wealthy and of nobility (174e-175b), where 
the philosopher’s ‘cosmic perspective’ sees through the pettiness and 
small-mindedness of conventional distinctions involving wealth-based 
status and the purity of bloodlines. It must be emphasized that this 
‘cosmic perspective’ is not merely a superior perspective compared to 
those ‘stuck’ on the ‘ground level’, as it were. Rather, seeing things 
from this perspective is seeing them as they truly are—the distance 
allows us to regard them soberly rather than mistake them from our 
too-close proximity as we stumble along myopically within the 
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quotidian. Consider two of Socrates’ examples there: the most extensive 
landowners still possess plots of land that are the equivalent of a drop 
of water in the ocean, when viewed from the cosmic perspective, and 
thus their pretension to be ‘great’ on this basis is ridiculous, while those 
who claim a noble bloodline on the basis of a certain number of noble 
ancestors or by tracing their lineage back to some exalted demigod are 
again guilty of myopia—they stop at the ancestor that fulfills their 
pretentious claim while ignoring the fact that if one merely looks 
further back one inevitably finds a base ancestor. As Socrates puts it, 
‘every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, 
among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, 
barbarians and Greeks’ (175a). Here we begin to see the rudiments of 
the Cynic cosmopolitan attempt to conceive of a universal political 
community on the basis of shared human kinship that overcomes 
provincial and short-sighted exclusionary prejudices. 
Cynic Hyperbolism, or How Wrong Life Can Be Lived Rightly 
Aristotle, in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, defines virtue as a 
mean between extremes that is not invariable and inflexible, nothing 
objective out there in the world independent of us but rather always a 
‘mean relative to us (to [meson] de pros hēmas)’ (NE II.6, 1106a35-
1106b1). This follows an earlier claim, which is another variant of a 
recurring motif, that  
…matters of conduct and expediency have nothing fixed or 
invariable about them, any more than have matters of 
health. And if this is true of the general theory of ethics, still 
less is exact precision possible in dealing with particular 
cases of conduct.’ (NE II.2, 1104a4-7) 
Aristotle’s conception of virtue as a situation-specific mean between 
extremes,40 always to be determined by phronēsis within a concrete set 
of circumstances, entails extreme difficulty in hitting the mark. Indeed, 
this extreme difficulty and its rare accomplishment is in tension with 
his claim that such virtuous action is the natural end of human life, 
given that nature as principle describes the goal to be accomplished 
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always or for the most part by beings with a principle of motion within 
themselves, including living beings and including the human being. 
However, Aristotle offers some practical advice, tips for target practice, 
as it were: (1) In aiming at the mean we should err toward the extreme 
that is less vicious (i.e., err on the side of caution, with the ‘lesser evil’ 
resulting if we miss the mark); (2) we should tend exaggeratedly 
toward those vices to which we are disinclined in order to hit the mean 
(overcorrect to offset our existing bad habits); and, finally, (3) we must 
be extremely guarded in relation to pleasures to avoid being pulled 
wide of the mark by them. These three practical bits of advice all reveal 
that in extreme situations extreme measures may be necessary to avoid 
the extremes that are vice and to successfully achieve the mean that is 
virtue. If we are navigating a narrow path it is better to go astray in the 
less bad way, if we are struggling against an already existing vicious 
inclination it is better to exaggerate our conduct toward the opposite 
vice, and if the alluring seduction of pleasure beguiles it is better to be 
overly austere than to indulge ourselves. Since virtuous action is a 
moving target and circumstances are constantly changing,41 there are 
many situations in which deliberately overshooting the mark is in fact 
advisable.  
The Cynics practice an art of deliberately overshooting the mark, 
which in what follows will be characterized as hyperbolicism. Diogenes 
decides to live in a barrel when the building of his cottage is delayed,42 
he throws away his cup when he sees a child drinking water from its 
cupped hands,43 he rolls around in hot sand during the summer and 
embraces snow-covered statues in the winter,44 he enters the theatre as 
the audience is exiting,45 and so forth. Any one of these actions could 
well seem a bit extreme and yet each can also be seen as a deliberate 
and studied attempt to overshoot the mark so as to hit it, to make 
adjustments for the wind and weather, so to speak, of vicious 
inclination become predominant. This is particularly clear if we 
recognize that these actions are not a universal prescription for 
humanity much less the expression of an inflexible and consistent 
principle on the part of the Cynic but rather are situation-specific 
attempts to respond to the extreme conditions of life in 4th century 
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Greece, in which the polis, the traditional political community, was 
disintegrating and being supplanted by Macedonian imperialism. 
Extreme political and economic instability called for a correspondingly 
extreme ethical practice if the individual was to hope to still find 
happiness amidst the ruins of a dying order. Yet, far from thus reducing 
Cynicism to a historically appropriate response to a historically specific 
situation we can also take from this the outlines of a theory and praxis 
of resistance to political and economic instability more generally, as the 
prototype for satiric criticism and radical agitation that motivates 
outrage at socioeconomic injustices. In other words, perhaps a universal 
lesson is to be derived from the particular case study. The attempt to 
imagine and to actually in some sense institute a universal political 
community, a cosmopolis, responds to particular crises by attempting 
to overcome the partisanship of the particular. To overcome 4th century 
Greek instability a universal human community is required, and as with 
Socrates’ earlier remarks here too we note that existing exclusionary 
practices are to be confronted with a politics of inclusion, of making 
room for those left out and giving them a place ‘at the table’.  
In her discussion of the growing employment of mercenaries 
during the 4th century, Nancy Demand points out that as small farmers 
were undermined by constant warfare ravaging their land, and as they 
lacked the necessary financial means to rebuild during the fragile 
periods of peace, concentration of land into the hands of a wealthy few 
became more prevalent. The smaller farmers ‘sold out’ to the 
opportunistic rich, and then flooded the cities looking for work. 
Demand notes that:  
Thus the poor filled the cities, the wealthy accumulated 
larger and larger estates, and the gulf between the rich and 
the poor grew. Constant civil strife brought exile  and loss of 
property to large numbers of even the wealthiest, 
transforming men overnight from respectable landowners 
into wandering, homeless exiles. Tens of thousands of such 
homeless and destitute men roamed about Greece, often 
endangering the settled population.46  
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G.E.M. de Ste. Croix puts the matter more bluntly: ‘In the 
political sphere, democracy barely held its own in the fourth 
century, and in many cities outside Athens the class warfare 
which had already become widespread in the last quarter of the 
fifth century became more acute.’47 Meanwhile in philosophy at 
this time we find a series of attempts to imagine a perfectly just 
political community,48 such as Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s 
‘practicable utopia’ of Books VII and VII of the Politics, both of 
which remain extant, whereas their Cynic and later Stoic 
analogues are lost, with only meager fragments preserved.  
The significance of the decline of the polis for the elaboration of 
Cynic cosmopolitanism is often remarked upon. I.M. Nakhov argues 
that ‘The historical significance and function of Cynic cosmopolitanism’ 
emerges from out of the historical, political and economic context of the 
disintegrating polis of the 4th century, in the wake of the Peloponnesian 
War and on the verge of submergence into Macedonian hegemony. As 
Nakhov puts it,   
Neither slaves nor metics, the emancipated and the very 
poor who had lost their worldly possessions in the war, who 
had to suffer hunger and illness and wander from place to 
place in their search for sustenance, recognized fervent 
patriotism. Restricted in the exercise of their human and 
civil rights they saw the world as a vale of tears, as an arena 
in the struggle for survival, in which harsh labor and 
suffering were their lot. Indeed, it is in fact not even 
important in which land one suffered all of that and from 
where one’s forefathers came. The Cynics gave expression to 
the sentiment of these classes of people and with the 
radicalism peculiar to them repudiated civil rights in every 
polis, whether or not it was their native city. Cynicism 
condemned the existing state in every present form—be it 
democratic, oligarchic, aristocratic or tyrannical.’49  
While condemning every existing political community, and thus 
perhaps seeming entirely negative and impossibly exaggerated in their 
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hostility to existing regimes we must not overlook the fact that the 
Cynics lived within these imperfect existing states and sought to 
reform and transform them from the inside, and offered, as we will see 
below, a number of positive proposals as well as a positive conception of 
a much more inclusive and rational form of political association that 
would take the place of what they were condemning. Nakhov’s 
suggestion that ‘This [Cynic] critique [of the polis] did not in the 
least spring from the wish to make anything better’50 is thus 
uncharitable in its assumption that radical and thoroughgoing critique 
must be entirely negative, destructive, perhaps even nihilistic. This is 
particularly disappointing given Nakhov’s sensitivity to the social and 
economic background of the emergence of Cynicism. On my reading, in 
contrast, the Cynics simply recognize that if one wishes to make 
anything better one must always start from a proper and thorough 
understanding of just what, and how very much, is wrong in the first 
place. The Cynic acknowledges this, makes it manifest and renders it 
palpable, and seeks to get others to do so as well in the hopes of 
motivating radical social and political transformation, and certainly has 
a conception of what a well-functioning and flourishing human life 
looks like, at least in outline, even if this presents at times an all too 
negative outline, imagined from out of the depths of current injustices 
and malformations. 
We should beware of overstating Cynic hyperbolicism, of reading 
it too literally and viewing it as posing a model for human life that is 
too difficult and primitive to ever win wide support or even be plausible 
for most human beings. On the one hand, the Cynic way of life 
responded to the real dangers besetting most human beings in their 
time: exile, impoverishment, hunger, homelessness, and enslavement. 
On the other hand, Diogenes is quite clear that he does not want others 
to imitate him or live his way of life: ‘He used to say that he followed 
the example of the trainers of choruses; for they too set the note a little 
high, to ensure that the rest should hit the right note (D.L. VI.35). It is 
crucial when interpreting the Cynics to always understand in advance 
that they are deliberately ‘setting the note a little high’ (and sometimes 
more than a little) in order that others, less able or willing to go to 
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such extremes, will hit the right note. Cynic hyperbolicism, like 
Aristotle’s practical advice for hitting the mean in adverse conditions, is 
deliberate overshooting of the mark for the sake of hitting the mark. 
This alone, to say nothing of the often polemic or Stoicizing tendency 
of the sources, requires careful attention, heeding the nuances and the 
goal (telos) that Cynic elegant simplicity (euteleia) is aiming to reach so 
that we do not miss the mark in our interpretation and take them to be 
absurd or pathological extremists who were simply vain attention-
seekers or even nihilists. 
Cynic Politics as Negative Task: Ideology Critique and Militant Agitation 
In turning to a consideration of Cynic politics it is first necessary 
to clearly understand the polysemy of the oracle received by Diogenes 
so that we can grasp both the negative and positive aspects of Cynic 
political-philosophical views and practice. According to Julian, the 
oracle commanded Diogenes paracharaxon to nomisma or ‘transvaluate 
the values’ (To the Uneducated Cynics, VIII). The first ambiguity to 
confront is the double-meaning of nomisma, meaning both ‘currency’ 
and ‘current values’ or ‘customary beliefs’. The second ambiguity 
concerns the imperative form of the verb paracharattein or ‘to 
transvaluate’, which, as Nieheus-Pröbsting has pointed out,51 can mean 
to alter a stamp used to mint coins, to re-stamp coins already stamped, 
or finally to use a fabricated stamp to mint base metal into coins. 
William Desmond ignores all three of these possibilities and asserts a 
fourth one exclusively: ‘putting the coin (nomisma) of custom (nomos) 
out of circulation.’52 More precisely, this is actually a version of option 
two, where one re-stamps already minted coins in such a way as to de-
legitimize their usage and render them worthless, something like 
blotting out the serial numbers and seals on a piece of paper currency. 
Is Cynic transvaluation simply a rendering inoperable of traditional 
values? There are good reasons for rejecting such a thesis.53 On my 
reading, Cynic transvaluation seeks to redeem existing values by 
subjecting them to an immanent critique that reveals their present 
inadequacy in order to motivate us to remake them into what they are 
supposed to be, i.e., adequate.  
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Leaving aside the stories told about the historical Diogenes as 
either a counterfeiter or an assistant of his father, Hicesias, who was a 
counterfeiter, the philosophical significance of the oracle hinges on just 
what ‘transvaluating’ the ‘current values’ amounts to when thought 
through the metaphor of minting coins. Following Nieheus-Pröbsting, 
the philosophical practice intended is clearly one of re-stamping coins 
already stamped, ‘transvalution’ of (already existing) ‘values’, which has 
a Nietzschean ring because Nietzsche appropriated the Cynic oracle for 
his own purposes in his later work. Diogenes re-stamps traditional 
values with new values, replaces an outmoded or inadequate traditional 
view with a new view better suited for the present, based on careful 
observation of the various phenomena in question, with careful 
attention to embodiment and material exigencies. Negatively, this 
consists in showing how and why current values are inadequate and in 
fact no longer truly current while at the same time, positively, 
replacing them with something better and more accurate that 
appropriately fits the situation at hand. At a deeper level, which must 
left aside here,54 this reflects a more basic mission of showing how 
discrete and diverse phenomena are not simply subsumed into their 
concepts, are in fact often incongruous when thought in the light of the 
concepts supposedly explaining them.  
But why, one might ask, do currently accepted values require 
transvaluation from the Cynic in the first place? The answer can be 
seen from another consideration of the Cynic relation to Socrates and 
the Socratic true political art. According to Niehueus-Pröbsting, for 
Socrates, ‘active politics’ aiming at the common good is renounced in 
favour of ‘an indirect path of concerning himself with affairs of the state 
that consists of testing and advising individual citizens on an individual 
basis, but not the assembly of citizens as a political organ.’55 However, 
‘the indirect path’ Socrates charts is in fact not inactive (in the sense of 
being merely a private affair) in contrast to a traditional publicly active 
political role but rather a Socratic transvaluation of the political task 
itself and a carrying out of that task in a new way that is the only way 
still genuinely possible under the deteriorating conditions of Athenian 
political life in the late fifth and early fourth century.56 Socrates, after 
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all, is nothing if not active, and to his enemies is a meddling busybody. 
The Cynics carry on his oblique and yet active true politics.  
Nieheus-Pröbsting argues that Socrates navigates a middle 
position between the utter estrangement of an Aristippus and the 
political engagement of an Alcibiades or a Nicias. This middle position 
of simultaneous political engagement that is indirect and yet distanced 
from, outside of, traditional channels, is nonetheless still political since 
like a statesman, Socrates ‘attempts to realize once more the unity of 
individual self-preservation and the common good.’57 The Cynics, in 
contrast, tend a little more toward utter estrangement but only because 
in the interim, and with the death of Socrates, it became clear that it 
was no longer possible for a citizen to practice true politics: thus Plato 
moved his school outside the city and Aristotle followed suit, the latter 
even leaving Athens near the end of his life because ‘he did not wish the 
Athenians to sin twice against philosophy’ (Ael. VH III.36). The failure 
of Athens’ radical democracy to nurture genuine parrhēsia in the 
assembly, its displacement by rhetoric and demagoguery,58 meant that 
philosophers like Socrates and Diogenes had to practice it para-
politically, outside of and along the fringes of its traditional setting in 
the assembly, in places like the agora but also in the Piraeus and on the 
outskirts of town. And they did this for the sake of the common good 
yet without losing their lives in the process. In other words, the only 
place where politics could be carried out, where the common good had 
any hope of still being accomplished, was away from the site of its 
corruption, and in a new transvaluated practice that made it supremely 
political to engage one or a few at a time in open and free, fearless 
conversation for the sake of the well-being of their souls, rather than to 
address crowds for the sake of applause and votes.  
For the Cynics, Heinrich Gomperz notes, ‘[Reason] should 
ground theoretically the same transvaluation that is to be practically 
realized.’59 This of course does not mean that reason reveals that 
everything human beings are presently doing is simply vanity but 
rather it finds the true value already concealed, suppressed, denigrated, 
within social life and restores it or ‘re-valuates’ it to prominence, i.e., 
redeems value. Thus the practical realization is not active nihilism or 
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impossible utopianism but an attempt to work out from within a 
fundamental transformation of social life that returns it to its task of 
accomplishing the flourishing life of a community of rational animals. 
Diogenes, we are told, ‘Claimed to oppose [antitithenai] daring to 
fortune, nature to convention, and reason to suffering [pathei]’ (D.L. 
VI.38). This is sometimes taken to mean that Diogenes champions or 
advocates each of the latter terms, exalting them over the former and 
replacing the former with the latter as his transvaluative practice. 
However, the verb antitithenai should give us pause, for it does not 
mean to set above but, in its radical sense, to set (tithenai) in contrast 
(anti).  
What Diogenes in fact does is to hold the two terms of each 
relation open in opposition to each other, using each to critique the 
other and playing each off the other in order to do justice to each. 
Daring only makes sense if fortune really is something menacing, and 
the Cynic would hardly be heroic if he or she had managed to master 
fortune and then went about dominating it at every turn. Fortune and 
daring give meaning to each other in an opposition that must 
permanently be held open, with each new turn of fortune menacing 
even the most intrepid agent while remaining open to daring, capable 
of being navigated though it may require the cunning of Odysseus. 
Likewise, and more importantly for the political context, nature is not 
exalted over convention nor is reason simply exalted over suffering. 
Rather, nature is used as a critical model for the interrogation of the 
rationality of convention while reason is opposed to suffering so that 
suffering is allowed to ‘speak’ (legein) and disclose its plea (logos). 
Reason discovers either the meaning of suffering, that which was 
ignored at our peril, or, if it has no meaning, is brute subjection to 
violence, discovers this and seeks a way to overcome it by learning to 
listen to its plea. Convention is criticized when it deviates from nature 
not so that nature might replace it, something impossible for human 
beings as rational animals, but rather so that nature can inform the 
transformation of social conventions that are at present contraventions 
of rational human nature.  
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Thus, uncritically accepted social conventions, beliefs and 
practices, that have not been subjected to nature as a critical model, 
that have not been criticized and tested for their truth, are sometimes 
referred to by Cynics as typhos or ‘smoke’ (=ideology). Nomisma are not 
ideology as such: they are ideological only when they constitute ‘The 
opinion, of things that are not, that they (truly) are,’ as Sextus 
Empiricus describes the conception of typhos according to Monimus 
(adv. Math. VIII.5). When nomismata fail to grasp the truth of things 
and fail to live up to their promise, fail to accomplish the common good 
and preserve individual members of the political community, fail to 
regulate social life toward the end of shared flourishing and instead 
sanction the apparent though unreal flourishing of a few while 
consigning most to an all too real misery, then nomismata are so much 
typhos and those holding them so many typhloi (‘blind persons’). 
Antisthenes even characterizes the point of life and greatest good as 
freeing oneself from ideology,60 and when asked what the most 
important thing to learn was replied that it consisted in not having 
anything left to un-learn, i.e., being freed from the spell of ideology. 
Heinrich Gomperz points out, in his discussion of the Cynic conception 
of typhos (Einbildung), that ‘‘Ideology’ is at work particularly when one 
supposes that two of the same things or processes are different because 
they are more specifically determined in a particular place or at a 
particular time or else by an incidental circumstance.’61  
To put this in Adornian terms, Cynic ideology critique exposes 
the way in which ‘objects are not subsumed into their concepts.’62 The 
pointing out of incongruity in the manner Gomperz is here alluding to 
(which is one side of the coin, the other being the Cynic focus on 
singularity and the attempt to do justice to the ‘accidental’ in an 
account of essence) is central to this critical task, and the key to 
interpreting one of the fundamental purposes of Cynic humor. 
Inessential differences, such as birth, social status based on inherited 
wealth, as well as a variety of more concrete and mundane examples, 
are ideologically held to be essential, while significant differences of 
wisdom, knowledge, reason, or virtue are ignored. What counts as 
difference and what counts as identical is taken for granted and yet 
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often not merely mistaken but the site of social and political injustice, 
and the Cynic provocatively and humorously brings this to light. 
Frequent ideological targets of Cynic critique include: the polis in 
its existing forms (especially tyranny and democracy) as flourishing 
political community, masculinity in various guises (violent aggression, 
claim to mastery and lordship, athletics), traditional religious beliefs 
and practices (particularly the efficacy of prayer and beliefs or rituals 
pertaining to the afterlife), economic value as determined by monetary 
worth, Greek chauvinism, the facile esteem for leisure irrespective of its 
employment, traditional marriage and family life, and militarism. In 
none of these instances do the Cynics simply condemn an existing 
ideological value absolutely, offering no guidance for a better 
alternative and satisfied to merely mock and scorn. Rather, in each case 
they condemn existing ideological values and the practices they 
underpin for failing to live up to their own claims and their own 
promise to assure a meaningful and successful rational ordering of 
life.63 
Let us consider a few examples of the positive aspect lurking 
behind the Cynic negative critique of ideology. Antisthenes, a bastard 
(nothos), repeatedly criticizes the Athenians for their traditional 
conception of citizenship founded on a ‘pure’ Attic bloodline. 
Antisthenes rejects racial purity as criterion for citizenship by refusing 
to be reproached for being a ‘half-breed’ (nothos). He notes that ‘The 
mother of the gods is Phrygian’ (D.L. VI.1). Antisthenes’ critique of 
traditional citizenship and the conferral of status via birth is reiterated 
in his joke that the Athenians’ claim to be born of the earth makes them 
no less distinguished in their birth than insects (D.L. VI.1) and is 
sharpened in his response to someone who reproached him for not 
having two Athenian citizens for parents: ‘Nor were they both 
wrestlers…but yet I am a wrestler’ (D.L. VI.4). We can glean from this 
last response that what qualifies someone as a ‘citizen’ in Antisthenes’ 
eyes is what they can do, not who their parents were. Cynic 
cosmopolitan citizenship is concerned with activity, not passively 
inherited markers such as birth. It thus rejects a fundamental 
traditional belief: that the virtues or excellences of parents are 
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transmitted to their offspring, who passively receive them and carry 
them on. For Antisthenes, each generation is capable of something new. 
This already foreshadows something that deserves further 
consideration, a crucial contrast with Aristotle’s ontology: essence for 
the Cynic is not ‘what it was to be’ (to ti ēn einai) but something more 
like ‘what it is and can be’. If Antisthenes defined logos, the statement of 
essence, as ‘the making clear of what a thing was or is (ho to ti ēn ē esti)’ 
(D.L. VI.3) then we should see that for him just as a child is not 
doomed to be merely an exact replica of its parents, so too what a thing 
‘is’ is not merely a matter of the repetition of what engendered it; 
rather, the Cynic conception of essence involves self-invention and 
dynamic alteration beyond its precedence and provenance. It is no 
wonder, then, that the logos adequate to such essence is an endlessly 
inventive and improvisational one, attuned to the radically singularity 
of each new moment. 
Antisthenes’ humorous recommendation that the Athenians vote 
that horses are asses (D.L. VI.8), since they already do much the same 
thing in electing generals without training or experience, is not a 
condemnation of democracy or voting as such as it is a criticism of the 
belief that voting in and of itself sanctions a result as legitimate, as 
intelligent, confers a ‘real’ status upon something. Mere voting cannot 
and does not do this. Antisthenes is thus critical of the prevailing 
ignorance of the citizenry that would allow them to vote badly rather 
than critical of democratic institutions as such. Aristotle’s mention, in 
the Politics, of Antisthenes’ fable is perhaps also worth considering in 
the present context:  
Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be 
concerned with persons who are equal in birth and in ability, 
but there can be no law dealing with such men as those 
described [i.e., one or several exceptionally distinguished in 
virtue], for they are themselves a law; indeed a man would 
be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably 
they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions 
said when the hares made speeches in the assembly and 
	Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2015(1) 
	
30 
demanded that all should have equality. Pol. III.8, 1284a15 
(trans. by Jeffrey Henderson)  
As in Aesop’s fable, Antisthenes was reputed to have had the lions ask 
the hares, ‘Where are your claws and teeth?’ For Aristotle, it serves as 
a humorous illustration of the difference between genuine aristocrats 
and ordinary human beings, and between that ‘one or few’ of 
superlative virtue who are incommensurate with the political give and 
take of a polis and suited only to rule. Antisthenes’ joke as deployed by 
Aristotle is a humorous reminder of the very real difference between 
the reason and virtue of human beings: some human beings, a few, are 
supposedly like lions while most are like hares, and there is a real and 
essential difference between them. As we have already noted, in such a 
case the essence and definition of ‘the’ human being threatens to come 
undone, to bifurcate. But what might the fable mean for Antisthenes, 
what might its intent be and who its target audience? It was perhaps a 
bit of political realism intended for the underclasses. If the hares want 
to be equal with the lions they must grow claws and teeth. Human 
beings, unlike hares and lions, are one species. And human beings can 
supplement or transform their nature by training and art. The lower 
classes, those presently excluded from politics or marginalized, are 
advised by Antisthenes to make themselves strong enough that they 
can wrest equality by force from those already forcefully subjugating 
them, so that they do not simply remain prey. To this one can also add 
Antisthenes’ remark that ‘We should pray that our enemies be provided 
with all good things, except courage; for thus these good things will 
belong, not to their owners, but to those that conquer them’ (Plutarch, 
On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander, II.3, 336a). Those presently and 
conventionally wealthy and powerful are to have everything good 
except courage, they will be ‘cowardly lions’, as it were, which will 
leave everything good for those with courage since the latter will 
prevail over the former in struggle. Antisthenes, on this interpretation, 
is a revolutionary agitator. 
As William Desmond has argued in great detail, there was a 
traditional Greek ‘praise of poverty’ and critique of wealth running 
from Hesiod through Aristophanes and Socrates and on to the Cynics. 
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Yet, if such a critique was prevalent, it became all the more intensified 
in the Cynics to the degree that they were responding to the 
ostentatious display of luxury and opulence in an increasingly 
economically stratified 4th century world of city-states on the verge of 
irrelevancy in the face of Macedonian ascendancy.64 For his part, 
Aristotle considers three prominent ways of life in his day: the life of 
pleasure, that of honor (which is really a pursuit of virtue, being worthy 
of honor), and the contemplative life. After dismissing the first, 
qualifying the second, and postponing discussion of the third he offers a 
brusque dismissal of a hitherto unacknowledged fourth way of life, that 
of money-making. Such a way of life cannot be the way to achieve 
happiness, since the latter is a complete end, something worthwhile for 
its own sake, and yet money is only ever valuable as a means. The 
pursuit of something only good as a means in the belief that it is an end 
worthwhile for its own sake is, Aristotle points out, ‘constrained’ 
(biaios, NE I.5, 1096a6), which is another way of saying that it is 
‘contrary to nature’ (para physin).  
The Cynics share this view, as can be illustrated from several 
anecdotes: ‘[Diogenes], after seeing an avaricious man being carried 
out for burial, said ‘This man, after living an unlivable life [bion], left 
life behind for others’’ (Cod. Pal. Gr. 297 n. 71 f.118). We should note 
here that bios means ‘life’, ‘way of life’, and ‘means for living’ or 
‘livelihood’. All of these senses are in play at once in this fragment. Of 
Diogenes’ most famous student we learn that: ‘Crates let go of his 
possessions so that his possessions would not rule him’ (Kratēs apoluei 
ta Kratētos, hina mē ta Kratētos kratēsē ton Kratēta) (Apostol. X 5). Crates 
sets free what is ‘of Crates’ so that it does not ‘rule’ (kratein) Crates. In 
other words, Crates makes his life livable again by letting go of (or in 
Hill’s contemporary cosmopolitan framework ‘forgetting’) his previous 
unlivable life, his reified life, in which the ruler was ruled by that which 
was supposed to be evidence of his rule, his property. 
Diogenes and Crates both reject the pursuit of wealth as the ‘end’ 
of life, and thus agree with Aristotle’s critique of such a life as 
‘constrained’ (biaios) or contrary to nature. If, for the Cynic as for 
Ruskin ‘there is no wealth but life [well lived]’ then the problem with 
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avaricious pursuit of wealth is that it inverts the natural order 
according to which wealth only has value in service to a good life 
shared with others. The view of the avaricious seems to be that ‘There 
is no life but wealth’. Such a life is, according to the Cynics, a living 
death. The Cynics do not simply reject wealth or its pursuit, however. 
They recognize its pursuit as of a very limited validity, but before 
considering that we should first grasp their transvaluation of wealth. 
Antisthenes (in Xenoph. Symp. 3.8) claims that wealth for the Cynic is 
not money but rather is ‘in the soul’ (4.34). The ‘worthiest possession’ of 
Antisthenes’ ‘wealth’ (4.40) is his openness to any labor that will meet 
his needs, his refusal to view work (here ergon and not ponos) as ‘base’ 
(phaulos). This is of course quite opposed to Aristotle’s view of unskilled 
and even skilled labor as if not phaulos then at least incompatible with 
leisure, happiness, and obviously ‘wealth’ as well. Antisthenes goes on 
to say that his ‘most luxurious’ (abrotaton) possession is leisure, which 
might be thought to contradict the previous point about being willing 
to work to meet his simple needs, but in fact does not if we remember 
that, given the importance of ‘elegant simplicity’ (euteleia, mentioned at 
4.42), one never has to work for very long to meet one’s minimal needs 
and thus leisure can remain a ‘most luxurious’ possession. 
Against the Cyrenaic hedonist who views ponos as simply ‘pain’ to 
be avoided, Antisthenes, in his interpretation of the myth of Heracles, 
transvaluates ponos from pain to be avoided into good to be willingly 
endured and even sought after. Karl Joël directs our attention to the 
denial of the importance of consent or lack of consent for the estimation 
of the value of suffering by Aristippus, who asks Socrates what the 
difference is between those practicing voluntarily a ‘kingly art’ that 
includes enduring much toil, pain and suffering and those who 
experience such suffering involuntarily. As Aristippus puts it,  
‘For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner 
kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting 
or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no 
difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering.’ Mem. 
2.1.17 
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To suffer is evil, whether we will it or not, according to Aristippus. It 
might even be worse if we accede to it, since then we add our own folly 
to our suffering. In contrast, the important difference between 
voluntary ponos and involuntary pain is defended by the Cynic, and in 
fact voluntary pain is elaborated in contrast to involuntary pain. Karl 
Joël argues that ‘The whole point and purpose of Antisthenes’ 
reworking of the myth of Heracles’ was to ‘…celebrate pain, which had 
hitherto only been lamented as kakon, lupēron, as involuntary suffering, 
to celebrate it as an agathon, too, i.e., as a voluntarily undertaken 
performance.’65 Socrates argues (proto-Cynically) that the person 
voluntarily undergoing ponos is importantly different than the one 
involuntarily suffering it: the former can decide when to satisfy needs, 
while the latter has no choice but to experience ponos as pain, to wish it 
was over and one could have one’s desires satisfied. Also, the one 
undergoing pain voluntarily actually enjoys it because he or she is 
animated by the hope of a successful conclusion (a work accomplished, 
victory, a product) while the one undergoing it involuntarily has no 
such hope. As will be discussed shortly, Antisthenes argues that 
pleasures are better after ponos than before them and for that reason 
alone pain is valuable: it makes pleasures superior. 
Joël goes on to argue that the Cynic transvaluation of pain is 
closely connected with the socio-economic question of voluntary versus 
involuntary undergoing of difficult and painful work: ‘With ponos, the 
Cynic has ennobled labor and has made a matter of the doulos as akōn 
into a matter of the eleutheros as hekōn.’66 The ‘dirty work’ done by 
slaves, necessary but supposedly incompatible with freedom, is deemed 
worthy of a free person, if it is voluntarily undergone and affirmed. Joël 
points to a passage in Xenophon’s Cyrus (VIII.1.4) for support, where 
the same point is made. The unpleasant ‘toil’ of hunting is adduced as 
exemplary: just as hunters rise early and undergo pain in the course of 
hunt, yet do so voluntarily and with pleasure, animated by the hope of 
trophy or game, so too the Cynic undergoes ponos in the hope of the 
freedom acquired thereby from subjection to the demands for 
immediate sensual gratification. Another passage from Xenphon’s Cyrus 
is then mentioned, and in both the pattern (Muster) is the same: ‘…the 
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eschewal of instant gratification so that through ponos an even greater 
gain will be achieved later.’67  
It is precisely the inability or unwillingness to ever defer 
gratification for a greater good that distinguishes Aristippus from the 
Cynic, Joël argues (citing D.L. II.66 for support). What is also evident 
from this passage is that the Cyrenaic hedonist ‘adapts’ (harmosasthai) to 
circumstances for the sake of ephemeral pleasures while the Cynic (D.L. 
VI.22) ‘finds a way through adversity’ (poron exeure tēs peristaseōs), 
which involves a process of mutual mediation, in which circumstances 
are changed in addition to one’s own ‘adapting’ to circumstances, and 
where the emphasis is on changing circumstances, changing the 
supposedly ‘objective’ terms of events that are ‘not up to us’, so that a 
positive outcome is won back from adversity. This difference is 
occluded in the Loeb translation (R.D. Hicks) of these two passages 
where both Aristippus and Diogenes simply ‘adapt’ to circumstances. 
Antisthenes’ remarks on pleasure and labor: ‘One should pursue the 
pleasures that accompany labors, and not the ones that are enjoyed 
instead of labors’ (Stob. III.29.65) and Joël’s basic point about the Cynic 
psychology of pleasure, that ‘the hēdonai are at work in advance as 
hopes and hence already co-operative in the ponoi’68 ought to be 
fruitfully analyzed from a Blochian utopian perspective: in an unjust 
social life one often defers one’s pleasures, sublimates them into hopes 
that animate one’s labor, so that one can bring about a better condition 
in which those pleasures can then be realized in a full and genuine 
sense.69 
One final aspect of the Cynic transvaluation of the traditional 
notion of wealth is its equation with not material goods or currency but 
rather that which gives wealth itself its value, self-sufficiency: 
‘Diogenes having been asked who among human beings he called rich 
replied, ‘The person who is self-sufficient’’ (Stob. III.10.62). Wealth is 
only valuable insofar as it frees one to live well, and to do the latter not 
in vulgar or conventional ways (to be esteemed for wealth, to live for 
reputation and honor, to dominate others, to maximize sensual 
pleasures) but rather to be freed from the compulsion of physical need 
and free for, creative, rational activity, for what, as we saw above, Kant 
	Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2015(1) 
	
35 
would call Mündigkeit or ‘maturity’, autonomy, to cease being a 
domesticated animal whose rational activity is controlled by and 
deformed in the Gängelwagen of traditional, conventional submission to 
established authorities who are ‘kind’ enough to do that work for 
everyone else. Thus conventional ‘wealth’ should be kept to a 
minimum, since its purpose is not to provide the ‘good things in life’ 
but rather to provide what is absolutely materially necessary so that 
one may then act and live well. Happiness, again, for the Cynics as for 
Aristotle is activity and not possession nor consumption nor a passive 
state of being. However, the Cynics are not absolutely opposed to 
traditional wealth:  
Diogenes used to liken most of the rich to the trees and 
vines growing in impassable and precipitous places. For, 
human beings cannot take hold of their fruit, but crows and 
other such scavengers consume it. And they do not set aside 
wealth for suitable purposes but fund flatterers and 
prostitutes for both shameful pleasures and utterly vain 
opinions.’ (Stob. IV.31.48)  
Here the Cynic critique of wealth is directed at the economic structure, 
at private property and economic stratification. From a passage like 
this one can see that the Cynics are not absolutely opposed to wealth, 
do not believe that it is ‘simply’ or utterly evil, but rather are opposed 
to its accumulation and irrationality in a traditional stratified economy. 
The interpretation that the Cynics view wealth as completely evil and 
to be dispensed with, along with my reading here that it has value for 
them but only if used correctly, are already reflected in the two 
different versions of the fate of Crates’ wealth: on the one hand, he 
throws it into the sea, while on the other hand he redistributes it to 
others. While acknowledging the tension I find it more likely that 
redistribution and economic reorganization were the ultimate Cynic 
position, with the strict rejection of wealth only a reaction to the given, 
fundamentally exclusionary and unjust social and economic order. In 
such a wrong life throwing money away is better than trying to use it 
for consoling and consuming pleasures that use one up. 
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Cynic Cosmopolitics and the ‘Republic’ of Diogenes: Towards a Positive 
Conception of Cynic Political Philosophy 
The Cynics are typically taken to have a merely negative 
conception of politics and a merely negative conception of freedom. On 
such a view, they criticize conventional politics and advocate a return 
to nature in the sense of a return to a primitive and animalistic pre-
political life. They see the polis not very much unlike some of the 
sophists did, as an institution whose laws and customs hinder the 
nature of human beings and facilitate their domination rather than 
happiness. Thus, the best thing for a human being to do is to live 
outside the law and outside of the polis, and if one dwells within it to 
subject its repressive features to withering critique and condemnation 
on behalf of nature and a freer life. In response to Aristotle’s pointed 
dismissal of one who would live outside the polis, as being either beast 
or god, the Cynics could be read as responding that life inside the polis 
renders one all too human, in the sense of an errant creature whose 
nature at times seems to be its deviation from nature and the spending 
of its life in thrall to false idols. And yet, as has already been argued, to 
view the Cynics as merely negative critics misses the positive moments 
of redemption within their critique. Furthermore, as will be seen in 
what follows, such a view misses the positive articulation of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism and overlooks their positive political proposals, which 
however radical are nonetheless an attempt to think a new politics and 
a new political community in which peace, leisure, freedom and a 
flourishing life of virtuous activity are shared by all, regardless of 
gender, ethnicity or social class.  
Cynic cosmopolitanism is most often read as merely negative. 
According to one representative exponent of this view, ‘When 
Diogenes called himself a ‘citizen of the cosmos’, a ‘cosmopolitan’, he 
was denying membership of any particular existing city, not imagining 
a world-state’.70 Yet, as J.L. Moles has argued, such a traditional 
reading overlooks a number of important points that suggest, to the 
contrary, that Cynic cosmopolitanism is in fact a positive conception of 
a universally inclusive political community rather than a mere figure of 
speech expressing the rejection of any existing political community. 
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Moles offers five ‘proofs’ for a positive conception of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism: (1) Diogenes’ own statements of his cosmopolitanism 
are positive (at D.L. VI.63 and VI.72), not negative; (2) Diogenes’ 
cosmopolitanism emerges from a tradition of thinking a positive, 
broader political community than individual poleis—since his 
precedents are positive he, too, should be read positively; (3) Diogenes 
is opposed to Aristippus and since the latter is a negative cosmopolitan 
therefore the former is a positive cosmopolitan; (4) Diogenes’ mission is 
to ‘deface the currency’ by means of paradox, and so his 
cosmopolitanism is deliberately paradoxical: a polis, necessarily a local 
community bordered by other poleis, which is supposedly as vast as the 
cosmos, which encompasses everything—to read this as merely a claim 
to have no polis is ‘intolerably banal’; (5) the paradoxes that emerge 
from Cynic cosmopolitanism—the political outsider as advocate of 
politics, the mocker of astronomy as a citizen of the cosmos, require 
‘substantive answers’ that must be formulated positively.71 The fact 
that Diogenes explicitly presents his conception of citizenship in 
positive terms rather than rejecting citizenship as such, in the manner 
of Aristippus, should be taken seriously, not ignored.  
Furthermore, the fact that Diogenes’ cosmopolitanism has 
precedence in the utopian thought of his contemporaries and 
antecedents, in Plato and comic poets such as Aristophanes and Crates, 
for instance, all of whom offer positive articulations of a more inclusive 
politics, is also to be heeded. The fundamental opposition between the 
Cynics and Cyrenaics, the fact that they seem to exist by virtue of a 
constitutive contrariness to each other entails that if Aristippus is an 
utterly negative cosmopolitan, a stranger wherever he goes, Diogenes 
should be read as a positive cosmopolitan, at home wherever he is. The 
reduction of Cynic cosmopolitanism to the negative rejection of all 
existing poleis loses sight of the essential paradox at the heart of the 
Cynic conception, which asks us to think a political community 
traditionally founded on exclusion (at the most basic level a 
geographical occupation of a certain territory that excludes everything 
outside of its border as alien and other) instead in terms of that which is 
most inclusive of all, the cosmos, in which everything that exists, 
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including all human beings, have their proper place. Reading the Cynic 
cosmopolis as equivalent to ou-polis (an ou-topia, ‘no-where’, as in 
William Morris’ News from Nowhere) ignores the significance of cosmos, 
whose ‘good order’ implies eu-polis (an eu-topia, or properly flourishing 
political community) though it is no easy task to grasp its significance 
given the apparent Cynic rejection of astronomy. One thing that is 
clear, though, is that grasping the significance of cosmic citizenship 
requires a positive articulation of politics that rejection of any local 
citizenship fails to provide,72 particularly when such rejection is 
supposedly offered by someone who nonetheless spends the whole of 
his life neither in the clouds nor in the stars,73 nor in contemplation of 
them, but rather lives much like Socrates, engaged in constant 
interaction with fellow human beings in the midst of the most refined 
and sophisticated cities in the world.  
From Philodemus’ polemical account we learn that Diogenes in 
his Politeia envisioned the following conditions for the Cynic 
cosmopolis: dice for currency (astragalois nomiteusthai), the uselessness 
of weapons, their being rendered superfluous (achrēstias tōn hoplōn). 
Mention is made of cannibalism, sexual liberation that is depicted as 
wanton profligacy including allowance for rape and incest, equality of 
women with men, raising of children in common, and, finally, patricide 
as well. Of course, Diogenes advocates neither cannibalism nor 
patricide, neither rape nor incest, as a general policy for an ideal Cynic 
political community. These remarks, whose context is difficult to 
reconstruct from the fragmentary and polemical context of Philodemus, 
would probably have been made in a typical Cynic appropriation of 
sophistic eristic aiming to deliberately scandalize common sense and 
customary beliefs by showing how even the seemingly most firm and 
unshakable social conventions were in fact tenuous and dubious when 
subjected to subtle human reasoning and observation of nature.  
The upshot of such paradoxes was not actually to advocate for 
cannibalism, incest, rape and patricide, but to show that as things stood 
at present, human beings were but a finger’s breadth from madness74 
and already guilty of devouring, violating, and murdering each other in 
ways not much distinct from that of the monsters generally taken to be 
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so exceptional—the cannibal, the rapist, the committer of incest and the 
parricide. The traditional customs that kept human consumption of 
animal flesh restricted to certain kinds but not others, the sexual laws 
that prohibited certain forms of conduct while allowing others or 
sanctioned transgression under a variety of circumstances (festivals, 
rituals, etc.), the drawing of certain lines around unspeakable conduct 
that simultaneously allows unspeakable violation to occur every day so 
long as it remains confined within traditional boundaries, all were 
subjected to a thoroughgoing investigation and critique by the Cynic, 
who was unafraid to discuss the most sacred taboos with utter 
fearlessness and even nonchalance.  
In each case, we must remember the purpose of Cynic 
hyperbolicism: not to actually lead others toward an almost absurd 
extremism but rather to loosen and liberate the iron grip of irrational 
beliefs, in this case concerning the purity of both food and sexual 
relations and the avoidance of blood-pollution.75 If, as in Anaxagoras, 
‘everything is in everything’ (en panti panta), then the crust of bread and 
olives contain remnants of human flesh, one’s wife or enemy remnants 
of one’s ancestors, and so forth. In other words, the Cynic argues 
against purity and sharp boundaries in order to advocate not for filth 
and license but rather for awareness of the messiness and 
interconnection of things, their universal imbrication rather than 
relegation to exclusive spheres that can be neatly managed to allow for 
one to murder and eat the flesh of one animal (a pig) while scrupulously 
avoiding murdering and eating the flesh of another (a human being), to 
sleep with one partner (a spouse) while avoiding sleeping with another 
(a parent), to not rape one person (a fellow member of one’s 
community) while raping many others (those of the enemy’s village 
after its conquest), to not murder one (a father) while murdering others 
(the fathers in a neighboring community).  
To reduce the Cynic point to a rather banal one: either eat all 
meat or none at all, have sexual relations without discrimination or else 
simply based on the consent of those involved, rape indiscriminately or 
not all, murder one’s parents or cease murdering altogether, but do not 
try to have it both ways and then sanction the hypocrisy with the cloak 
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of convention. The deliberate inhabitation of paradox and pushing 
ordinary thought to extraordinary extremes is the Cynic exposure of 
the folly already hiding in plain sight, in everyday rituals of purity and 
the simultaneous establishment of rules and exceptions to those rules 
on an arbitrary basis.  
From Philodemus we also learn, as noted above, that: ‘Diogenes 
in his Politeia ordains by law that knuckle-bones [i.e., dice] be used for 
currency’ (Athen. IV 159 C). First we should recall that, as one scholar 
puts it, ‘knucklebones were apparently not associated with gambling for 
money; instead they seem to have been identified with sacrifice, with 
the gods and fate, with the dead, and with the innocent game[s] of 
children.’76 However, Cynic agnosticism and religious irreverence 
preclude interpreting the Cynics as advocating the use of knucklebones 
for traditional forms of divination or for religious ritual, as does the fact 
that we are trying to puzzle through what it might mean to use 
knucklebones as setting values, in either a narrowly monetary sense or 
a more general sense of convention, ‘values’ as indicators of ethical life. 
It is more likely that Cynic usage of knucklebones was akin to the 
‘games of children’, though with a serious purpose, however difficult to 
reconstruct. 
Bekircan Tahberer cites a passage in Pausanias in which a cultic 
use of knucklebones for the reception of prophesy is described—a 
shrine dedicated to Heracles, no less, who was something akin to the 
‘patron saint’ of the ancient Cynics. It is difficult to surmise what the 
connection might be here between a traditional religious usage of 
knucklebones and the Cynic appropriation in this political, and yet 
playful, context. One possibility, which I merely suggest speculatively, 
is that the Cynics do hold onto something of the kind of ritual 
Pausanias describes but detach it from its sacred context and 
submission to religious experts—presumably the one who interpreted 
the meaning of the knucklebones’ fall was a ‘professional’ exegete, a 
religious official in the traditional version—and instead take over for 
themselves the use of knucklebones not to help figure out what the 
future might hold but to assist in actively constituting what the future 
will hold.  
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If the future is determined by fortune, which approximates to an 
endless series of rolls of the dice determining how any one moment 
turns out, then the Cynic would correspond to this state of affairs by 
carrying his or her own dice, which are rolled to see how one should 
‘value’ something, and which function as a kind of cunning 
counterpunch to the blows of fortune, a way of transforming the turns 
of fortune into the turns of a game. Two questions that are central for 
interpreting the passage in question are: Should we read nomiteusthai 
(to establish as nomisma) here in the two-fold way as with the oracle? 
And what does it mean to think dice as currency?77 One place to look 
for answers is D.L. VI.35, where we read that ‘Very valuable things, 
said he, were exchanged [pipraskesthai] for things of no value, and vice 
versa. At all events a statue fetches three thousand drachmas, while a 
quart of barley-flour is sold for two copper coins.’78 On the one hand, 
Diogenes thinks that the given values for goods are already so absurd 
that to use dice would actually be more rational. On the other hand, he 
thinks that the irrationality of the current respective values of such 
goods as statues and barley is already about as rational as a throw of the 
dice.79  
Finally, the values of goods, at least at present, under conditions 
of prevalent irrationality, are to be seen as merely the expressions of 
fortune, to be met with elegant simplicity and maneuverability such 
that a throw of the dice is the only way to keep an ideal marketplace 
interesting, through constant ‘shuffling’ of values. Aleatory 
determination of value can be read as a parodic critique of the 
irrationality of uncritically accepted given values; it can be read as a 
perhaps exaggerated caricature of that irrationality, or it can even be 
affirmed as a positive principle of an economics of experimentalism for 
a liberated society in which no one goes without and yet the prices 
fluctuate wildly like odds or stakes in an ever-shifting contest or game 
of chance. This last possibility, on my reading, is the positive import of 
Diogenes’ recommendation that dice be used as currency in the 
cosmopolis. Economic transactions would become a game when they 
take on a purely symbolic and playful aspect after the realm of necessity 
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has been subdued and basic needs are secured for all members of the 
community. 
The uselessness of weapons for the Cynic cosmopolis reflects 
their irrelevance in a community where there is no longer motive for 
violence nor need for defense since on the one hand everything 
necessary is provided, while on the other hand nothing superfluous and 
luxurious, nothing traditionally ‘valuable’, needs to be secured from 
theft or the pillaging of an invading force. The motives for violence, 
sexual frustration or avarice, are overcome in a community that has 
achieved sexual liberation and the satisfaction of basic needs for all. 
Thus, with everything one needs in easy reach and with nothing 
luxurious or ornate by which one might distinguish oneself from others 
(at least nothing in terms of possessions, with one’s action and life 
being the only field for happiness and distinction), there no longer is 
need for weapons to protect the borders of ‘mine’ from ‘thine’. Social 
provision of basic necessities (simple food, clothing, modest housing, 
basic medicine) and their abundant availability free human beings from 
need, and the absence of ornamental and luxury goods as status 
markers for the conspicuous consumption of an elite remove in advance 
a violent contest for such baubles.80  
Two more features of the Cynic cosmopolis worth considering are 
the equality of women and the communal raising of children. Diogenes’ 
stipulation in the Politeia that ‘Men and women are to wear the same 
attire and participate in the same pursuits’ (Philodem. Peri tōn Stōikōn 
[V.H. VIII, papyr. N. 339] coll. XI-X) of course echoes Plato’s Republic 
but should also be related to Antisthenes’ claim that ‘virtue is the same 
for men and women’ (Andros kai gynaikos hē autē aretē) (D.L. VI.12), as 
well as to the exchange between Hipparchia and Theodorus, where the 
Cynic replies to the atheist fellow-traveler that a women’s place is no 
longer in the home.81 From the three passages one can confidently read 
the Cynics as committed to equality of men and women not merely in 
the abstract, nor merely in formal political terms, but also in the 
concrete, in everyday life and one’s regular activities. Women were not 
merely the equal of men and to be treated the same in political decision-
making and under the law, but were considered equally capable in a 
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broad sense, as human beings, and were to frequent all the places men 
did, from horse-races and gymnasia to symposia.  
Communal raising of children is another utopian feature that 
Diogenes’ Politeia shares with Plato’s, and the extension of the family is 
to be thought here rather than its elimination. A community as wide as 
the universe is supposed to be a place where one can feel at home 
wherever one is; thus humanity is imagined as one family and all 
children as essentially siblings and cousins. In fact, it is just such a 
universalization of the family that might best explain the supposed 
Cynic ‘endorsement’ of incest.  
Conclusion 
I have attempted to outline the positive features of the Cynic 
cosmopolis, and argued against reading the Cynics as merely critics of 
the chauvinist and exclusive political communities of their time. 
However, beyond this I have also attempted to connect them to the 
cosmopolitan lineage of which they are the founders, and thus to 
restore to them their rightful place as starting point for thinking the 
philosophical significance of cosmopolitanism.  
The three features of Hill’s contemporary cosmopolitanism discussed at 
the outset of this essay can now be seen to parallel the three moments 
of Cynic transvaluative critique of uncritically accepted social 
conventions and traditional ideological beliefs: ‘Moral forgetting’ is the 
first stage, where traditional values are ‘taken out of circulation’. This 
is the entirely negative moment when values are obliterated, when the 
memory even of the violation that damaging values have had upon one 
is worked through and left behind, so that the second moment, ‘moral 
maturity’, can become operative. Only when one has forgotten what 
one has been made into by such conventions and ideologies can one 
begin to take responsibility for what one is and will be moving forward. 
And only then can one realize the ‘creative agency’ of the third stage, 
which is where the traditional values that were obliterated are then re-
cast and reformulated into the deliberate products of morally mature 
ethical and political subjects.  
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In the life of Diogenes, for instance, one can trace this trajectory even 
in the general terms of the course of his career. This begins with the 
negative moment of ‘moral forgetting’, where he must leave behind his 
conventional status as banker’s son and citizen of Sinope and go into 
exile, to the middle moment of ‘moral maturity’. Next, on the basis of 
accomplishing self-sufficiency, via the ascetic arts of maneuverability 
and elegant simplicity, Diogenes is able to think on his own terms and 
offer a compelling critique of conventional political life. Finally, comes 
the moment most relevant for the present essay, that of ‘creative 
agency’ where Diogenes is no longer merely satisfied to condemn 
existing political communities for their hypocrisies, irrationalities, and 
injustices but also ingeniously contrives a positive vision of a better 
socioeconomic order. Diogenes’ cosmopolis, under this framework, is 
the creative act of a morally mature agent who, because he no longer 
has anything left to ‘un-learn’, has successfully carried out moral 
forgetting. 
  The social, political, and economic crisis of the 4th century polis 
led not merely to the disintegration of its legitimacy but also to 
Cynicism as the counter-force to ideologies of domination that would 
preserve slavery and privilege amidst widespread poverty and 
exclusion. The Cynics thus appear as agitators for a revolutionary 
transformation of society that would abolish class privilege, gender 
privilege, ethnic privilege and replace them with a universal human 
community that does not merely speak of equality but attempts to 
realize it in practice: albeit through an unconventional practice akin to 
the Socratic ‘true political art’, by inviting human beings to become 
fellow-members of a para-political cosmopolis.  
Immanuel Kant has claimed that ‘…if we consider the free 
exercise of the human will broadly, we can ultimately discern a regular 
progression in its appearances. History further lets us hope that, in this 
way, that which seems confused and irregular when considering 
particular individuals can nonetheless be recognized as a steadily 
progressing, albeit slow development of the original capacities of the 
entire species.’82 The original endowment, reason, evolves on the whole 
regardless of individual quirks. Cynic cosmopolitanism should be 
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interpreted as an attempt to make good on the promise of reason for 
the political animal, a shared life of flourishing together with others. 
While the individual Cynic’s actions may seem ‘chaotic’ they are 
animated by this world-historical task of rationalizing human social life 
so that it fulfills its natural end (human flourishing).  
What they are attempting to do is to bring back into 
consideration elements of political life that more established traditional 
theories—such as Plato’s or Aristotle’s ideal cities—leave out: the 
flourishing of all those elements of society that are relegated to a 
supporting role and excluded from a truly human life, i.e., women, 
slaves and the working poor, resident aliens and barbarians, perhaps 
even children and animals. Kant goes on to argue that  
…nothing entirely straight can be fashioned from the 
crooked wood of which humankind is made. Nature has 
charged us only with approximating this idea. That this task 
is also the last to be carried out also follows from the fact 
that such a constitution requires the right conception of its 
nature, a great store of experience practiced in many affairs 
of the world, and, above all of this, a good will that is 
prepared to accept such a constitution. The combination of 
all these three elements is very difficult, however, and can 
occur only late, after many futile attempts.’83  
It is certainly arguable as to whether Diogenes has a ‘correct 
conception of a possible constitution’. It is unlikely one can 
conclusively decide for or against such a claim, given the paucity 
of sources and their polemical presentation of source material now 
lost to us. Few could argue that we would find anyone with 
greater experience who wandered through more paths of life than 
he did, from wealthy citizen to destitute exile, from the envy of 
Alexander to the object of insults and beatings. He is in dialogue 
with Plato and Aristotle—and with statues that cannot hear his 
plea for alms. He wanders from Sinope to Athens to Corinth, 
making trips to various Panhellenic games. Sold into slavery he 
becomes his master’s teacher, advising him as an expert in the art 
	Yearbook of the Centre for Cosmopolitan Studies, 2015(1) 
	
46 
of living well and even issuing commands as though a doctor or 
pilot.  
To close with Kant’s metaphor: the Cynic cosmopolitan 
project is a shrewd attempt to build something straight from 
crooked timber. When human nature becomes warped it is 
possible to straighten it out by a measured counter-warping, 
hence the absurd exaggerations of Cynic hyperbolic discourse. 
Cynic cosmopolitanism was the first and perhaps most acute 
‘futile attempt’ at a cosmopolitan constitution.  
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mad, but, if it’s the little finger, he will not think so.’ Trans. by Hicks. 
75 Dudley rightly notes the hostile polemical context of the sources here (such as Philodemus) 
and also properly places the Cynic paradoxes within their sophistic context: ‘…these 
statements cannot be taken at their face value to imply that Diogenes recommended incest and 
cannibalism….The anaideia of Diogenes was therefore didactic; undertaken to expose the 
artificiality of convention’ (A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. [London: 
Methuen & Co., 1937], 30-31).  
76 Bekircan Tahberer, ‘Astragaloi on Ancient Coins: Game Pieces or Agents of Prophecy?’ In: 
The Celator 26.4 (2012), 10. 
77 T. Gomperz (Greek Thinkers, 161) interprets Diogenes’ recommendation to use knucklebones 
for currency as indicating the purely conventional value of money, and even as prefiguring the 
later usage of paper currency. He argues that this was motivated by the desire to ‘prevent the 
accumulation of movable wealth’ (ibid) but it is unclear how carrying dice around is supposed to 
be analogous to the Spartan use of lead weights for currency (unless we imagine very heavy 
dice). 
78 Trans. by Hicks modified.  
79 Another way that the Cynics interpret the irrationality of money and exchange value is, in 
proto-Marxist fashion, as a magical fetish. In Lucian’s Demonax we learn that, ‘When a fellow 
claimed to be a sorcerer and to have spells so potent that by their agency he could prevail on 
everybody to give him whatever he wanted, Demonax said: ‘Nothing strange in that! I am in 
the same business: follow me to the breadwoman’s, if you like, and you shall see me persuade 
her to give me bread with a single spell and a tiny charm’, implying that a coin is as good as a 
spell’ (23, trans. by A.M. Harmon). The lesson here is not all that different from what a recent 
Marxist critic of capital points out as an example of fetishism: ‘The supermarket is riddled with 
fetishistic signs and disguises. The lettuce costs half as much as half a pound of tomatoes. But 
where did the lettuce and the tomatoes come from and who was it that worked to produce them 
and who brought them to the supermarket? And why does one item cost so much more than 
another? Moreover, who has the right to attach some kabbalistic sign like $ or € or £ over the 
items for sale and who puts a number on them, like $1 a pound or €2 a kilo? Commodities 
magically appear in the supermarkets with a price tag attached such that customers with money 
can satisfy their wants and needs depending upon how much money they have in their pockets. 
We get used to all this, but we don’t notice that we have no idea where most of the items come 
from, how they were produced, by whom and under what conditions, or why, exactly, they 
exchange in the ratios they do and what the money we use is really all about…’ (David Harvey, 
Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014], 5-6).  
80 As T. Gomperz puts it, ‘If, then, no one is allowed to own more than is required for the 
satisfaction of his most elementary needs, if all possession beyond this is to be regarded as 
hurtful to the possessor, there is an end of every occasion and every motive for plundering, 
enslaving, or oppressing others’ (Greek Thinkers, 163).  
81 D.L. VI.98: ‘And when he [i.e., Theodorus] said to her [i.e., Hipparchia]: ‘Is this she / Who 
quitting woof and warp and comb and loom?’ she replied, ‘It is I, Theodorus, – but do you 
suppose that I have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further time upon the 
loom I spent it in education?’’   
82 Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings, 3.  
83 Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings, 9. 
